Governance and territorial regulation of the metropolis in Germany and France

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APPEL A CANDIDATURES
A la lumière des expériences étrangères, que nous disent les résultats du programme de recherche Popsu 2 ?
Article POPSU II “Governance and territorial regulation of the metropolis in Germany and France”

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1. Introduction

Metropolitan regions and forms of territorial governance related to them have gained a great deal of attention in France and Germany at least since the 1990ies (Lefèvre 1998; Fürst 2005; Négrier 2005). The increasing relevance was both related to aspects of economic competitiveness and the regulation of territorial development. New forms of metropolitan governance have been tried out with regard to competitiveness, provision of inter-municipal services and spatial planning with quite different outcomes concerning the institutional form that has been selected for the metropolitan regions as well as the performance of those new governance arrangements with regard to policies such as transport and mobility as
well as housing and urban regeneration. Only in a few European states larger reforms that affected metropolitan governance have been conducted. These include France, Italy, England and – to a lesser degree – Poland (see contributions to the Special Issue of Raumforschung und Raumordnung 2017).

In France, reforms are currently taking place that have been initiated at the national level. These reforms introduced new forms of institutional regulation of territorial development and administration. The Act for the Modernization of the Forms of Territorial Action of the State (Maptam), adopted in 2014 (and followed by the loi NOTRe in 2015), was probably the most influential one and introduced a new form of intermunicipal cooperation (or to be more precise: jurisdiction) called métropole that is vested with more competences and financial resources than the previous forms of intermunicipal groupings and has since then been implemented in fifteen French city regions (Geppert 2017). In Germany, too, there are continuous discussions about metropolitan regions and their functions for the economic and social development of the country, but, due to the federal structure of the German state, there is no nation-wide regulation or clear direction of reform (Fürst 2005; 2006).

Against this background, we have read and evaluated the material from the POPSU II program made available to us and looked at it in a comparative way from a number of different perspectives. First of all, the question of national urban (or metropolitan) policies seems to be relevant for us, as certain path dependencies exist and new developments have emerged, which in our opinion correspond to the respective national style or culture of regulating territorial development. In particular, the notion of “Métropole” in France and “Metropolregion” in Germany seems to be connoted differently in each country. In France, Métropole in the context of the new law Maptam refers to a jurisdiction in institutional terms and, in spatial terms, what we would call a city region (Regionalstadt or Regionalkreis). In Germany, Metropolregion is used to describe huge territories going far beyond city regions without having the quality of a jurisdiction. It’s close to what is called a pôle metropolitain in the French context since the launch of a national initiative in 2009/10 (see case of Grenoble below).

The authors of the POPSU II program, however, use a wider and more process-oriented notion of metropolis as they describe both morphological (and spatial) as well as socio-economic aspects of metropolitanisation without, of course, entirely
neglecting the dimension of governance. Métropole is both a legal status and a label in terms of being an important economic centre with an international or at least national radiance.

Against this background, our contribution is structured like this:

Section 2 focuses briefly on the role and function of metropolitan regions and urban regions in the two countries since the 1960s and introduces the case study regions regarding the evolvement of governance and institutions. Three case studies from Germany are presented (Frankfurt - Rhine / Main, Stuttgart and the Ruhr). The regions were chosen because they represent specific types of territorial regulation that are dominant in Germany. We wouldn’t, however, call them ideal types in the sense of Max Weber as the variation as too high. Moreover, they show territorial and institutional challenges that are comparable to the regions studied in the POPSU II program. This is indicated by reference to the POPSU material, the city regions of Nantes, Toulouse, Bordeaux and Grenoble in particular. Further reference is made with fewer details to the German Region of Hanover.

The following section 3 introduces very briefly a framework for the comparative consideration of case studies and presents the case study material following three dimensions. The material from the POPSU II program emphasizes local narratives, largely without carrying out systematic comparisons between the ten cases. However, the case studies and the teams working on them selected specific dimensions (so-called thematic axes), which ensure a minimum of comparability and orientation. We follow this approach and focus on German city regions and their respective histories. We focus on the thematic axis Governance and Spatial Planning (or in broader terms: territorial regulation), which includes both spatial, institutional and actor-related aspects (for example, political leadership, re-scaling).

The information given in the POPSU cases concerning institutional form and territorial regulation are collected for four cases that included sufficient knowledge regarding this thematic axis and seemed conclusive for a comparison. The final section 4 gives an overall summary.

2. Role of agglomerations and national urban policies in the two states

2.1 Germany

The history of metropolitan governance in Germany goes back to the times of late industrialization. It was in the period of 1910 - 1920 when metropolitan solutions
for infrastructure planning, settlement development and protection of green spaces were discussed in the rapidly growing industrial agglomerations. In these days, Berlin (1916) and the Ruhr area (1920) were exemplary cases for different ways of organizing metropolitan politics and planning. While in Berlin a regional city (Groß-Berlin) was realized through annexation of the smaller contiguous municipalities of the core city, in the Ruhr area an association of municipalities was created (Kommunalverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk). Since then, metropolitan governance solutions have been realized in German city regions in various policy sectors such as waste management, public transport, protection of green spaces and settlement development and on various spatial scales. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of intensive debate on issues of metropolitaniation and many institutional solutions have been discussed and, in part, have been implemented. Most of them followed the ideal of metropolitan government, i.e. a strong metropolitan unit or organisation with considerable legitimacy based on a regional assembly (directly elected by the citizens of the region) and a wide scope of tasks. These organisations of the 1970s focused on planning issues, public transport and other public services such as waste management. In particular the combination of transport planning, public transport management (light rail and busses) and regional planning of settlements was deemed highly relevant but realized only in few cases. This trend was observable also in other European states such as Spain, the UK and Denmark but the political will to establish a metropolitan tier for public policies and planning on a nationwide scale was strongest in France and, to a lesser degree in Germany.

However, in Germany only in a few cases (Hanover, Frankfurt, Saarbrücken, Braunschweig) strong multi-purpose associations have been created that were responsible for a larger portfolio of functions on the spatial scale of city regions and even in these cases we hesitate to call them metropolitan governments as they did not constitute an independent layer of politics. Municipalities were still strong and hardly accepted the new metropolitan institution. This became apparent in the case of the Umlandverband Frankfurt (UVF) that had to face strong opposition of the mayors of municipalities. The UVF was established in 1975 as a multipurpose planning association but had to face opposition from the municipalities from the beginning (Heinelt et al. 2011). Interestingly, the foundation of the UVF in 1975 marked the end of the period of metropolitan reform in Germany. During the 1980s and until the beginning of the 1990s, a new localism dominated the agenda of metropolitan governance. The scholarly literature refers to the next period (1990s
onwards) as the period of new regionalism (Heinelt and Kübler 2005). During this period that prevails until today, new actors governance forms and scales and new functions have been introduced. The new regionalism with a strong focus on economic development, competitiveness and internationalization of territorial development policies overwhelmed the debate and covered the progress made in some regions in the governance of public services and spatial planning.

Although some authors consider this as period of “experimental regionalism” (Fürst 2006), the creation of inter-municipal associations (kommunale Zweckverbände or Regionalverbände) still is the instrument most frequently used in Germany for the organisation of public services and planning functions in metropolitan areas (Fürst et al. 1990; Heinelt and Zimmermann 2011). The initiatives that emerged under the new regionalism in Germany added new forms of cooperation between public and private actors (Public Private Partnerships, contracts), regional development agencies, regional conferences, informal networks and were less bound to jurisdictional boundaries. However, the impact on the formal institutional framework was very low. Germany follows a pattern of modernization and reform that is less prone to dynamic changes compared to the recent discussions and legal reforms in Italy, the England, Poland and France where new layers of metropolitan policy-making and planning have been created based on nationwide laws (or abolished). What we observe in Germany is a continuous and flexible adaptation of existing legal frameworks and institutions (Fürst 2006). The 1990s brought some changes as the inclusion of private actors came up and new formats for the cooperation of public and private actors were implemented in quite a few regions. However, with a few exceptions no major reforms took place (Fürst 2005; Heinelt and Zimmermann 2011).

A recent joint initiative of the 16 states and federal government is of particular interest against the background of POPSU II. The creation of the “Initiative European Metropolitan Regions in Germany” EMR (Initiativkreis Europäische Metropolregionen IKM) in 2001 is nowadays an important element of the debate on metropolitan regions. EMR can be seen as a network of the largest German metropolitan regions (see map in appendix). The EMR initiative is exceptional in the German institutional context as it is a joined initiative of the states and the federal government and under supervision of the Standing Conference of Federal and State Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning (Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung, MKRO). However, there are no changes in the institutional framework of local
government. We can consider the initiative as a more soft intervention without granting any substantial legal responsibilities or subsidies to metropolitan organisations. Inter-municipal cooperation under this scheme is voluntary. All the 11 members of EMR are defined as metropolitan areas in terms of economic, societal and cultural functions (Blottevogel and Schmitt 2006; Harrison and Growe 2014). These areas are, following the argument of EMR, seen as the engines of economic and societal development in Germany. Therefore, local politicians make a claim for support and recognition in national and European policy schemes. In fact this has found conceptual recognition in several policy documents such as the national policy guidance for spatial development in 2006 and 2016 (BMVBS 2006; BMVI 2016). With regard to the political organization the 11 regions are expected to establish mechanism of self-governance in whatever form that is considered appropriate. However, as there is neither pressure nor financial incentives the ambitions and results differ from region to region and institutional solutions don’t go at the expense of other layers of local self-government (counties and municipalities). What we can say today is that the initiative was a window of opportunity for the smaller metropolitan regions such as Nuremberg and Rhine-Neckar that joined this network officially in 2005. They were innovative and established new metropolitan governance structures and, therefore, found much professional recognition for what they have created in recent years. For these smaller, less visible and polycentric regions, where a single city can’t mobilize critical mass to become internationally competitive, it seems to be more likely that mutual benefits can be realized based on cooperation, whereas actors in the bigger metropolitan regions such as Frankfurt/Rhine-Main or Rhine-Ruhr were less inclined to cooperate or to sustain existing schemes of cooperation. In the mentioned regions also the spatial delimitation did not proceed smoothly and remained vague. The fact that jurisdictional boundaries usually are incompatible with existing functional interdependencies and the size made the task very difficult. The delimitation is left to the decision of the local actors in the respective metropolises. As a rule the delimitation of most of the EMR under question is rather big, reaching far beyond the borders of existing statutory planning regions.

The emergence of a new scale of territorial development policies as a result of the EMR initiative since the late 1990s can be described as a pattern of combination of a

1 See www.deutsche-metropolregionen.org
strong institutional core on a smaller scale (usually planning associations in city regions, in part created in the 1970s) and softer forms of governance on larger scales (metropolitan regions). This pattern can be observed in Hannover where a three-scaled constellation has been established as well as in Stuttgart and Munich where we observe two scales. These scales are the result of different political dynamics such as the introduction of the European Metropolitan Regions as a new informal layer of metropolitan politics and, as a result, these layers compete for resources and cooperate at the same time.

In the following, we will briefly introduce the evolvement of metropolitan governance in three case studies. We refer here only to the governance of city regions because in terms of competences and size they are the unit that is comparable with the French métropole. Most of the issues of intermunicipal planning and politics are relevant on this scale of city regions. The impact of the creation of the mentioned larger metropolitan region (comparable to a certain degree to the French pôle métropolitain) will be addressed in section 3.4 (spaces and scales).

The debate about regional reform in the Stuttgart region started in the late 1980s, and in 1994 a new institutional layer of metropolitan policy-making and planning was established by law of the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg. The Verband Region Stuttgart is not a jurisdiction but an intermunicipal association with some degree of autonomy due to a directly regional assembly. It is considered to be an exceptional case as it was the first metropolitan governance arrangement established after a longer period of localism in Germany (Fürst 2005; Heinelt et al. 2011). Stuttgart was the first region in Germany where inter-municipal co-operation and the institutionalization of metropolitan governance was motivated by an economic crisis and where the business community actively participated in the reform process. The goal of the reform was enhancing competitiveness of the region by establishing a new form of collaboration between public and private actors. The reform followed a pro-development agenda: strengthening the region in the European competition of the regions. Inter-municipal cooperation was widely accepted as a solution to the modernization of the infrastructure of regional relevance and for investment in collective completion goods (trade fair, airport, new railway station). However, next to the idea of competitiveness, the reform process in Stuttgart was also influenced by a long-standing conflict between the core city and adjacent smaller towns. The region encompasses 179 municipalities organized in
five counties and the city of Stuttgart (in total 3,654 square kilometers with 2.6 million residents). Only 23% (580,000 residents) of the population of the region lives in the core city and the number of daily commuters in the whole region is about 700,000 persons (Region Stuttgart 2006). Most of these commuters live in well off medium sized cities like Esslingen (90,000), Böblingen (45,600), Sindelfingen (61,000) and Leonberg (44,000) (see Heinz et al. 2004: 32). As a result of strong processes of suburbanization, an unbalanced distribution of costs in support of public infrastructure (trams, cultural facilities, schools) and social segregation the relation between the core city and the surrounding counties and towns was always difficult (Heinz et al. 2004: 34–35). In addition, problems of land use such as competitive planning in respect of infrastructure and business development areas or the conflict between inner city development and large retail centers outside the (core) city have led to conflicts since the 1970s. During the reform process, the mayor of the city of Stuttgart tried several times to bring these issues on the agenda with little success.

The association is fully responsible for regional planning, landscape planning and management of landscape parks and regional transport planning (light rail or S-Bahn in particular). Other tasks are shared with the counties (and the agencies established by them). These include transport management (regional busses), economic development and waste management. In addition, the association can take full or shared responsibility for further tasks such as the trade fair, congresses, culture and big sports events (as the failed application for Olympic Games). This is based on the so-called competence-competence: the association may, based on a majority of two thirds of the assembly, take on new responsibilities of regional relevance (Heinz et al. 2004: 43).

Following the reform more regional initiatives emerged in support of the association though they are not part of it in formal terms (Heinelt et al. 2011). The most important one is the regional development agency founded in 1995 as a private enterprise. 51% of this agency is owned by the regional association that also nominates the director. Other shareholders are the municipalities, the development bank of the federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, the chamber of commerce and, to a minor degree, the labor unions. The association Verband Region Stuttgart is the organizational core of this networked pattern of regional governance.
The Ruhr area is considered to be a unique case because of its polycentric morphology and the legacy of heavy industry, which had a strong influence on settlement patterns and urban development for decades (Kunzmann 2004; Schmidt 2013). In 1920, due to rapid industrialization and urbanisation, concerns about balanced and healthy settlement development were raised and resulted in the foundation of an inter-municipal planning association (Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk). The Siedlungsverband was expected to give some regional guidance for the protection of green spaces, housing and settlement development as well as infrastructures of regional relevance. The approach was a political innovation as it was still an institution of local self-government with little hierarchical intervention of the state. The planning association experienced changeful periods since then. At the beginning of the 2000s again a debate started with various suggestions ranging from the idea of creating the Ruhr city (i.e. an amalgamation of the existing jurisdictions with more than five million inhabitants and a new name: the Ruhrstadt) to the creation of an agency under private law (Projekt Ruhr GmbH). One may add further suggestions and initiatives highlighting different aspects of regional development and regional cooperation (i.e. the Charta Ruhr, the numerous master plans or the Düsseldorfer Signal suggesting a government district Ruhr) (see Davy 2004; Kunzmann 2004; Schmidt 2013). As a result of these debates and in conjunction with a political change of the state government in 2004, the planning association was strengthened again and renamed Regionalverband Ruhr (Regional Association Ruhr or RVR). In 2009 the competence for statutory regional planning was given to the planning association that is now also in charge of a regional development agency. In 2015 the parliament of the state of Northrhine-Westfalia passed a new law that allows for more competences of the regional association, regional transport planning probably being the most important one. The law also stipulates that the direct election of the regional assembly will be introduced with next local elections in 2020.

Still, metropolitan governance in the Ruhr area is complex and fuzzy. Without doubt the RVR is one of the dominant players but there are other inter-municipal

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2 The association was responsible for regional planning in the past but in the 1970s, the state government gave this competence to the government offices of the regions (Regierungsbezirke).
associations such as the Ruhrverband responsible for fresh water management and the Emscher Association responsible for wastewater treatment and river basin management. The Emscher Association was founded 100 years ago by the municipalities and large industrial enterprises (steel factories and mining companies) in the early period of industrialisation. It’s task was to take care of waste water treatment, sanitation and flood protection. Since the 1990s the major task is the regeneration of the Emscher River system that was used as an open sewer for several decades and the construction of a new regional sanitation system. This is a 4 billion Euro investment that includes also the creation of regional landscape parks and urban development projects (Schmidt 2013). Further single purpose association exist that are responsible for regional public transport (light rail) or preservation of heritage buildings. The three Universities of the Ruhr (Dortmund, Bochum, Essen-Duisburg) formed an alliance, creating the research area Ruhr.

Hence, the constellation in the Ruhr is best described by the term “fragmegration” introduced by political scientists to find a proper description for European Multi-level Governance. Although a certain degree of integration and coordinated action can be observed, fragmentation is still considerable (Schmidt 2013). There is more than one logic of interaction and there is more than one institution but there are many that stand next to each other with different actors, different purposes and different rules for cooperation (Davy 2004).

The creation of metropolitan governance arrangements in the Frankfurt Rhine-Main region was always influenced by the dilemma of a polycentric region (Hoyler et al. 2006; Heinelt et al. 2011)). The city of Frankfurt with almost 700.000 inhabitants is the biggest city of the region with a high degree of centrality in terms of functions. Despite the fact that Frankfurt is an international centre for the financial service economy and a relevant international transport hub, the city is relatively small, when compared to other global cities, so its functional relationships with the adjacent cities and towns are of great importance. The morphological, institutional and functional structure of the region is polycentric - made up of a number of cities with a population between 100.000 and 250.000 inhabitants, like Offenbach and Hanau bordering on Frankfurt, Darmstadt and Wiesbaden (which is the capital city of Hesse) as well as Aschaffenburg and Mainz which are in the federal states of Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate. Besides these bigger cities, the five
counties of the region act as strongholds of local interests in the debate about a possible consolidated regional government.

An intermunicipal planning association was established in 1975 (Umlandverband Frankfurt, UVF). This association brought together 43 of the suburban municipalities around the city of Frankfurt. In terms of governance, the UVF was considered an innovation because was governed by a system of two chambers: the directly elected regional assembly and a municipal chamber with the mayors as its members. The regional assembly had a stronger legitimacy and therefore was expected to be core of policy making. The second chamber had more a control function with veto powers. The catchment area was considered far too narrow, which impaired the potential efficiency of the organization. Among the responsibilities of the UVF were (Heinelt et al. 2011):

- land use planning and coordination of land use (including landscape planning),
- provision and management of leisure facilities of regional relevance,
- transport planning and management of public transport water supply, sewage treatment, waste management.

The UVF was at least on paper a multipurpose association. However, the priority to develop residential areas in an integrated way was replaced by a greater focus on environmental protection and leisure facilities due to strong conflicts with the municipalities that used their veto powers in the second chamber for strategic purposes. What followed was a decade long debate on the appropriate form of metropolitan governance in this region. In 2001, the government of the federal state of Hessen abolished the UVF and transferred the planning responsibilities to a newly created planning association (Planungsverband Frankfurt/Rhein-Main). In terms of power and competences, this new association was weaker, but the territorial delimitation was bigger (the regional land use plan covering now 75 instead of 43 municipalities). Another body created in 2001 was the Council of the Region (Rat der Region). This gathering of mayors and county presidents was thought to discuss governance options for the other function that were in the responsibility of the former UVF such as transport, economic development, tourism and waste management. After 10 years of fruitless debates this council was abolished in 2011.

Apart from the bodies created by the state law in 2000, various other initiatives in the metropolitan area have flourished since the mid 1990s. These initiatives are
concerned with economic development, international marketing, culture, the regional landscape park and public transport. In particular the agencies focussed on economic development are organized as public private partnerships. This can be seen as a result of the perceived underperformance of the organizational setting established by the law of 2000. In particular the chamber of commerce claimed on several occasions for a more effective administrative organisation in the region. In 2011 the federal state intervened again and gave more powers to the regional planning association. However, the tangled, unstable and unmanageable networks of regional cooperation still prevail.

2.2 France
The French multilevel system of territorial governance is rather complicated with intermingled competences and the French government has induced numerous reforms in the past decades in order to create a more effective system. One of its particularities is the exceptionally huge number of over 35.000 municipalities. More than half count less than 500 inhabitants. This situation has led to the need for various forms of intermunicipal cooperation (EPCI, Syndicate mixte, see below) as an additional layer to the three territorial authorities municipality, département and region. Especially the city regions, where the continuous urban space covers several municipalities have a long history of intermunicipal cooperation reaching back to the 1960ies, sometimes even to the end of the 19th century, slowly evolving by increasing their competences and perimeter, flanked by National laws creating several organizational form and specifying their competences, institutions and financing.

The above-mentioned institutional form métropole is one of four types of municipal groupings with the right to raise their own taxes (EPCI établissement public de coopération intercommunale) and should be seen as one step in a longer evolvement of territorial reforms and the creation of municipal groupings: law relative aux communautés urbaines 1966 introducing the communauté urbaine CU, law ATR 1992 introducing the communauté de commune CC, law Chevènement 1999 introducing the communauté d’agglomération CA and linking the three types to characteristics of the settlement structure, law RCT 2010 first mentioning the métropoles and creating pôles métropolitains, law Maptam 2014 mandatorily creating métropoles by national law and lately law NOTRe 2015 concerning the competences of municipal groupings and territorial authorities. Whereas the four
types of EPCI (CC, CA, CU, métropoles) have directly elected councils, a wide range of competences especially concerning public services and planning and non-intersecting memberships, the pôles métropolitains are a softer, more flexible form of cooperation on a larger spatial scale mostly focusing on economic development and standing in the long tradition of French growth pole policies (métropoles d'équilibre in the 1960s).

Like the whole system of intermunicipal cooperation, the metropolitan regions are in a process of continuous change and adaptation both concerning their number, perimeter and functions. Since July 2016, fifteen city regions with the legal status of métropole exist and more might be created by transforming existing municipal groupings that will get the new label métropole, additional competences as well as financial means. The city region of Nice was the forerunner in January 2012, being the only one intrigued by the possibility given in the law RCT and becoming a métropole before the law MAPTAM (Geppert 2017). The city regions Bordeaux, Nantes, Toulouse and Grenoble all gained the status as métropole in January 2015 together with seven others (Lille, Montpellier, Rennes, Rouen, Strasbourg, Brest and Lyon) and Aix-Marseille, Grand Paris and Nancy were added in July 2016. All in all, the contributions of the POPSU programme do not deal much with the new institutional arrangement of the métropole. The introduction of this new institutional form was foreseeable, but as the empirical work took place in 2012-2014, the impact could not yet be considered. Most of the case studies give instead a long reaching historic overview of processes of metropolitanization in French city regions and the evolvement of metropolitan cooperation that started decades ago with single purpose associations that grew step by step in terms of size and degree of institutional integration.

Since 2014, the basic threshold in terms of size is 400.000 inhabitants for municipal groupings having at the same time a functional urban area of 650.000 inhabitants or more. The selection criteria have been subject to intensive discussions and have been eased several times as result of the pressure of smaller city regions with aspirations to become a métropole and exceptions have been made for regional capitals (Montpellier) and very integrated groupings already fulfilling the mandatory competences (Brest), whereas some of the largest cities had to be forced into this form of closer cooperation by national government (e.g. Aix-Marseille). If a city region requests this change of status to become a métropole, this is decided by the state on a case by case basis. The main difference compared to other forms of
municipal groupings is that métropoles are allowed to take over competences from the département, region and state (downscaling) additionally to upscaled municipal competences. Linked to the aspect of competitiveness and the contribution of métropoles to national economic growth, the status of a métropole has also an aspect of being on the map, especially for the smaller city regions. This is confirmed by the fact that many city region such as Nantes, Toulouse and Grenoble (CC called “Grenoble-Alpes Métropole” since 1996) officially called themselves métropole long before the law MAPTAM introduced this new layer of policymaking and planning (see POPSU reports on Nantes, Toulouse and Grenoble).

The distinction between (potential) métropoles and communautés d'urbaines is not so clear-cut in terms of size and economic weight as the group of métropoles themselves is heterogeneous with large ones with over 1 Mio inhabitants (Lille, Lyon, Aix-Marseille, Paris), medium-sized with 500.000 – 800.000 (Nice, Nantes, Toulouse, Bordeaux) and smaller ones with under 500.000 inhabitants (Rouen, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Montpellier, Rennes, Nancy, Brest). Several other candidates could become métropoles in the future as a range of larger CU and CA exist next to each other and two regions (Centre, Bourgogne-Franche-Comté) currently do not have a métropole on their territory. Strategic documents on the national level (Comité Balladur pour la réforme des collectivités territoriales 2009; DIACT 2009) initially suggested a number of only ten to twelve metropolitan regions. It is interesting to observe that both included Toulon, that is also part of the POPSU program, but is until today organized as communauté d’agglomération whereas Paris is not mentioned.

Paris has recently become a métropole, covering 131 municipalities and therefore having an additional intermediate governance layer, twelve so called établissements publics territoriaux EPT. The EPT are amongst others responsible for the local land use plans PLU, whereas a SCoT will be elaborated at metropolitan level. For a long time Paris was not mentioned as one of the metropolises despite – or rather because of – its evident economic weight and global radiance. The idea of strengthening a number of métropoles throughout the country was from the beginning aiming to counterweight Paris, meaning that it was more linked to debates on territorial cohesion. Putting forward the aim of a balanced polycentric urban network on the national scale, the regional radiance is more important than the weight on an international scale and the selected metropolises can be smaller than they would be looking from an European perspective.
The notion of métropole was first introduced in the 1960ies by the national programme «Métropoles d’équilibre » (1963-74). It was a turn in the French policy of regional development, because if focused for the first time on the larger cities instead of small urban centers and economically weaker regions. But already one decade later, at the beginning of the 1970ies the national subsidies were again concentrated on medium sized and later on small cities (Burgel 2009: 79). The programme started with eight métropoles in 1963 (Lyon-Saint-Étienne-Grenoble, Aix-Marseille, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes-Saint-Nazaire, Strasbourg, Nancy-Metz) and five more were added ten years later (Rennes, Dijon, Nice, Clermont-Ferrand, Rouen). Compared to the fifteen métropoles that exist today, it is interesting to note that they do not entirely match: the former métropoles d’équilibre Dijon (150.000 inhabitants, CU 254.000) and Clermont-Ferrand (140.000 inhabitants, CA 282.000) are not included and Lyon – Grenoble were part of one metropolis together with St Etienne. In general, the areas were much larger and more polycentric than todays métropoles, in that sense corresponding more to the new pôles métropolitains. The governance model was different in the 1960ies though, being top town with centralized decision making at national level, almost no influence of local stakeholders and one-fits-all solutions. The policy consisted of structural investment into infrastructure in the fields of transportation, higher education, health, e.g. regional airports in order to enhance the central functions of the cities and masterplans for the regional development elaborated by organizations founded for that purpose (Organismes Régionaux d’Etudes et d’Aménagement d’aire métropolitaine OREAM). The OREAM were abolished in 1983 and the cooperation areas that had been fixed by the state could not impose themselves against historic rivalries between neighbouring cities, but the notion métropole remained present in debates (Geppert 2009: 255f).

The soft instrument of pôles métropolitains and its interpretation in the regions shows perfectly how different the local governance arrangements are despite of national laws. In some regions there have been discussions to install either a métropole or a pôle métropolitain but not both. In the case of Aix-Marseille, the local politicians of Aix, Marseille, Aubagne and Etang de Berre had opted for a pôle, but the National Government enforced instead a métropole by law, that was even larger in perimeter, including two more EPCI in the ouest (AgAM 2012: 22; Douay 2013). The city regions of Nice, Bordeaux, Lille and Montpellier are as well constituted as métropole without belonging to any pôle métropolitain.
The second model is to see the pôle as an additional, larger layer, meaning that the métropole is at the same time part of one (Rennes, Strasbourg, Rouen, Lyon, Nancy) or even two pôles métropolitains (Nantes, Brest). In those cases, the softer pôles were founded first, in 2011-2012 (Silon Lorrain with Nancy; Strasbourg-Mulhouse; CREA Seine-Eure with Rouen; Nantes-St Nazaire; Pays de Brest; Espace Métropolitain Loire Bretagne including Nantes, Rennes, Angers and Brest; Lyon, Saint-Etienne, Vienne, CAPI) whereas the functionally more consolidated métropoles with a smaller perimeter were constituted in 2015-2016. The reason is that most city regions opted for the creation of a pôle when both instruments were introduced by the law RCT in 2010, whereas the law MAPTAM (2014) enforced the creation of a métropole for all the bigger ones having a functional urban area of at least 650 000 inhabitants. A new aspect of the pôles in comparison to other forms of territorial organization is that they do not need to cover a continuous territory and that they are not exclusive, meaning that one EPCI (be it a métropole, CU, CA or CC) can be part of several pôle. Additionally since 2014 other partners can be included like the regions and départements as well as universities, port authorities, tourism agencies, economic development agencies, commerce chambers and the like (Aucame 2011: 2; Béhar et al. 2011: 1). Here again each region has found the specific form that seemed adapted to the local conditions and actors. Out of métropoles being part of a pôle métropolitain already constituted or in course of construction, almost all have chosen to create polycentric networks of cities with a certain distance in between instead of continuous spaces. A counterexample is Rouen being part of the pôle CREA Seine Eure together with only one other EPCI, the CA Seine Eure.

Though the pôles are a complementary layer above the EPCI, it cannot be said in a general way that all pôles are bigger in terms of surface than a municipal grouping, because some very large groupings recently have been created, namely the métropole Aix-Marseille with 3.173 km² and the CA Pays Basque with 2.967 km², whereas some of the compact pôles like Loire Angers, Pays du Mans and CREA Seine Eure are smaller.

It has to be stated that there is an overall enormous dynamic in the territorial entities and layers in France, be it the recently encouraged fusion of municipalities, the restructuring of municipal groupings towards larger and more integrated units or the redrawing of regional boundaries (2015) and a new repartition of competences. Concerning the role of the métropoles in the territorial hierarchy, they
are on the way to partially replace the département, either by taking over some competences (law NOTRe 2015) or getting the status of a département like in the case of Lyon.

In **Grenoble**, attempts to create a stable intermunicipal cooperation since the 1940ies remained unsuccessful at first. The intermunicipal collaboration began in the 1960ies with SIEPURG (1966, syndicat intercommunal d'études des problèmes d’urbanisme de la région grenobloise) and SIRG (1968, syndicat intercommunal de la région de Grenoble) being responsible for large infrastructure projects like a waste incineration plant. A syndicat for public transport was added in the 1970ies. In 1994, the existing structures where replaced by a communauté de communes, renamed „Grenoble-Alpes Métropole“ in 1996, transformed into a communauté d’agglo in 2000 and becoming a métropole in 2015. Although being an urban area with dense functional interrelationships, the municipalities deliberately choose the CC as least integrated form of municipal grouping. The primary reason to upgrade the cooperation form (from syndicat to CC and later CA) were higher state grants. The municipalities outside of Grenoble were eager to protect their autonomy and saw the municipal grouping over decades as a cooperative that should deal with technical services for the citizens and help the member municipalities to implement their own projects and not as an independent layer for common metropolitan visions. In consequence, intermunicipal issues were depoliticized, giving a strong position to technical expertise in order to keep conflicts small. The agencies of the métropole have now the task to create a common spirit and political idea of the city region (Louargant and Le Bras 2015: 170ff).

**Bordeaux** can be seen as a counterexample to the dynamic step by step evolution of metropolitan cooperation in many French city regions. Its intermunicipal institutions have remained stable for decades and have been driven by national initiatives. Being one of the largest cities in the country, Bordeaux was one of the four Communautés urbaines created in 1966 by the National government (Loi n° 66-1069 du 31 décembre 1966 relative aux communautés urbaines) and kept this form of municipal grouping until becoming a métropole in January 2015, again induced by national law.
**Toulouse** experienced intercommunal integration rather late. Whereas the municipalities in the south-east of Toulouse already joined forces in the 1970ies and the municipal groupings in most of today’s métropoles have a much longer history, the District du Grand Toulouse was founded only in 1992, becoming a CA in 2001. A stronger intermunicipal spirit and the will to develop a common strategy for the territorial development arose at the end of the 2000s, leading to a change of organizational form towards a CU in 2009 and a considerable enlargement of the area of metropolitan cooperation in 2011 from 25 to 37 municipalities. The renaming to “Toulouse métropole” followed in 2012 and the transformation into a métropole in the legal sense of law MAPTAM in 2015. The grouping is equipped with more competences, strategic documents are developed, participation processes are taking place and a development agency is founded.

The enlargement of the perimeter has been accompanied by the creation of the sublevel of “pôles territoriaux” (initially eight, since 1.1.2016 five) with the function to provide services in the proximity of the citizens and overcome the tension between center and periphery. This path is fostered by national policy in favor of metropolitan integration and the competition with other metropolitan regions that already had a more developed metropolitan governance. Despite the good economic development of Toulouse, its strong knowledge economy, high share of well-educated people and population growth, its weak intermunicipal construction was one factor leading to the judgement of an incomplete metropolisation (Balti et al 2016a: 51ff; Balti et al 2016b: 16f).

In 2000, the CU **Nantes** has been founded and since then the notion of Nantes Métropole was in use. The Charte de Fonctionnement de Nantes Métropole was adopted in the same year. The document defined the rules and competences of the intermunicipal association and was at the same time a sort of memorandum of understanding (Garat 2016: 97). The Charte also included the establishment of the Pôles de Proximité which was the most important element and central issue of metropolitan governance in the agglomeration of Nantes in the following decade. The concept of Pôles de Proximité is based on the idea of deconcentration and decentralization of the administration of the CU. The main goals was bringing metropolitan policies closer to the citizens by establishing local branches of the

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3 Syndicat intercommunal de la Vallée de l’Hers Sicoval founded in 1975, today CA du sud-est Toulousain with 36 municipalities
central administration in the districts of the CU – inspired by the practice of Barcelona after the Mayor of Nantes, Jean-Marc Ayrault, had visited the Catalanian capital (Garat 2016: 98). In the beginning, ten Pôles de Proximité were founded, the number was later reduced to seven. Their creation was a reaction to the de facto amalgamation of the CU (Métropole de Nantes) and Urban Development Policies of the City of Nantes (Devisme 2016: 18). In organizational terms this happened through the creation of so called DGs (directorate generals such as DGA, DGS) for various public policies. The DGs brought together staff of the CU and the city administration of Nantes.

What started as a process of administrative deconcentration emerged later as a process of contested political decentralization. The branches of the CU got more competences and autonomy. Part of this process were the so-called Contrat de Co-Development (Garat 2016: 95). These contracts were made between the CU and the pôles and had an impact on the regulation of territory as they de facto implied agreements on territorial development between the suburban municipalities and the core city. Regulation of settlement development followed a similar pattern. The Plan locale de Habitat (including a programme locale de l’habitat) was complemented since 2010 by so called fiche communale – a sort of local plans or municipal subplans. The fiche communale and the contrat de co-development established binding relationships between the CU and the municipalities. These mechanisms have been introduced due to the claim of the peripheral municipalities and serve also the prevention of conflicts between the core city and smaller municipalities and towns (Garat 2016: 97).

The year 2008 is a critical juncture or turning point in this process of decentralization (Garat 2016: 99-100). Between 2000 and 2007 the CU considered the Pôles de Proximité as decentralized branches without political power (implementing policies of CU). After 2008, the year of re-election of Jean-Marc Ayrault as Mayor of Nantes, the pôle got more competence (fiches communale and ZAC communautaires) and the tasks were defined more precisely. The Commission locale de pôle was then the local political body with limited leeway of decision-making. Before, the pôles were considered to be an instrument of control which resulted in an ongoing conflict and questioning of the pôle by the municipalities. In 2012, Jean-Marc Ayrault became Prime Minister and was less influential in local politics of Nantes. However, his main project for local and regional development, the Île de Nantes was accomplished at that point of time. The regeneration of this post-
industrial area, that became a mixed-use area for commercial and residential functions had an impact on the metropolitan region. A considerable amount of state subsidies was concentrated there and a special purpose agency was established that largely was responsible for the governance of the regeneration of this area: SAMOA: Societe d’aménagement de la métropole quest atlantique.

3. **Contrasting Juxtaposition of Cases in France and Germany**

3.1 **Comparative Framework and Approach for Cases**

The description of the case studies follows a narrative approach. The case study narratives will consider the following dimensions:

- **Actor dimension**: Actors involved, political Leadership – especially the role of the mayor of the core city, but also the director of the metropolitan administration; role of private actors;
- **Space and Scales**: multilevel governance system and the repartition of competences and resources between the different levels of territorial administration, size of cooperation area and jurisdictions, creation of new scales, metropolitanisation (growth of metropolitan area);
- **Ideas of Territorial Regulation**: competences for land use planning and type of plans on the metropolitan level.

3.2 **Actor Dimension - Political Leadership and pro-active private actors**

In France, the mayor of the core city seems to be the leading figure if the consolidation of inter-municipal cooperation is at stake. As we have illustrated above, the mayors of the core cities of Bordeaux, Lyon and Nantes exerted considerable influence. However, we hesitate to call this type of Leadership inclusive (in the sense of Hambleton 2015)⁴ as we feel that the mayors wanted to strengthen the role and influence of the core city. This is underlined by the double position the mayors usually have as president of the métropole (or CU) and the mayor of its biggest city. This is currently the case in France in 10 out of 15 cases (Grenoble is an

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⁴ Robin Hambleton makes a strong claim for what he calls New Civic Leadership (Hambleton 2015). He defines leadership not as an activity or capacity of a singular person (the elected leader) but in a much broader way: “Key elements in New Civic Leadership are an understanding that government can’t go it alone, that loyalty and a local sense of identity are invaluable resources, and that co-creation of public services can generate radical, new solutions” (Hambleton 2015: 75). Leadership and community involvement is complementary.
exception). Also, the well-known accumulation of political mandates from different territorial levels has implications with regard to local political leadership: several mayors are involved in national politics in high ranking positions and use this as an additional source of power.

**Bordeaux** can be seen as a prototype of an actor constellation with a strong leader. The city had with Jacques Chaban-Delmas (mayor of Bordeaux 1947-1995, president of the CU 1967-1977, 1983-1995 and minister in the 1950ies) and Alain Juppé (mayor of Bordeaux 1995-2004 and since 2006, president of the CU 1995-2004 and since 2014, former minister) two republican mayors both ruling for decades. The national level has been a power base for both, being several times minister and leading figures in their party, and they used this influence to mobilize national funds for large urban development projects in Bordeaux. In the case of Chaban-Delmas we can mention for example the bridge pont d’Aquitaine or the large scale project quartier Mériadeck (Sorbets 2015: 150); in the case of Juppé it’s the tramway and the riverside (Sorbets 2015: 155).

Also the case of **Nantes** confirms the relevance of political and administrative leadership on the local level. The mayor of the city of Nantes (Jean Marc Ayrault 1989-2012, Prime Minister 2012-2014) was at the same time director of the CU/Métropole de Nantes, President of the Syndicate mixte du SCoT Nantes – Saint Nazaire, President of Sociétés d’Economie Mixte, etc.). The mayor of Nantes is also the director of SAMOA (Societe d’aménagement de la métropole quest Atlantique), an urban development corporation with several public stakeholders and considerable resources that was largely responsible for the project Île de Nantes. This means an enormous concentration of power in the hands of the mayor of the core city. With regard to metropolitan leadership the implications are that inter-municipal cooperation is more or less dependent on the political leader of the core city or even an extension of the sphere of influence of the core city and the respective mayor. The case of Nantes shows that leadership includes also the organization of inner administrative power relations (Garat 2016: 101). The high ranking staff of the different branches of the administration was loyal.

**Toulouse** is a special case as the socialist Pierre Cohen, who was mayor of Toulouse and president of the intermunicipal grouping from 2008-2014 had before for almost
30 years been mayor of a small municipality at the southern periphery of Toulouse. The surrounding municipalities were traditionally rather skeptical about the consolidation of metropolitan governance, fearing the hegemony of Toulouse because of the monocentric structure of the city region with only one other municipality with over 30,000 inhabitants. The fact that they saw Cohen in some way as one of theirs made it possible to gain the unanimous support for a stronger integration and the passage from a CA to a CU in 2009 (Balti et al. 2016a: 53).

Grenoble on the other hand follows a “modèle fédéraliste de gestion” and is a counterexample to the overwhelming role of the mayor of the core city. Leadership within the metropolitan region was an issue that first blocked cooperation attempts as the smaller municipalities did not want the core city of Grenoble to be too influential. To make cooperation possible, Grenoble had to agree on an arrangement where its influence was far lower than its financial contribution and demographic weight: in the 1960ies all municipalities (at that time 23) had the same number of seats regardless of their size, since 1973 Grenoble had 13 out of 62 seats still being in a minority position and in 2016 31 out of 124 seats. A model of double leadership was implemented in Grenoble: the president of the municipal grouping traditionally is a mayor of one of the surrounding municipalities, but not from the core city.

In Germany, the mayor of the biggest city rarely plays a leading role in pushing the creation of metropolitan regions, which are often rather seen as a structure weakening the influence of the core city. The difference might be caused by the different territorial outreach. In Germany, metropolitan initiatives are truly regional with regard to their territorial outreach while in France, they include in many cases the adjacent suburban municipalities. In general, the debates on metropolitan reforms are less personalized in Germany. However, this does not mean that leadership is irrelevant for a successful regional reform. In the cases of Hanover and Stuttgart leadership was an important factor for the success of the reform. In Hanover, three leading civil servants of the three relevant organizations (the county, the city of Hanover and the planning association) played an important role for successful reforms. We may call this administrative or technical leadership as these persons were experienced bureaucrats but not community leaders or politicians.

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5 Mayor of Ramonville-Saint-Agne, from 1989-2008; the municipality is directly bordering Toulouse, but is not part of the métropole
In **Stuttgart**, there was an important engagement on the part of private actors from the business sphere who claimed for a regional reform. The representatives of the labor unions were also involved in the reform process. Leading personalities from the business community, like Hans-Peter-Stihl (the president of the German as well as of the regional chamber of commerce at that time) and Edzard Reuter (the then CEO of Daimler-Benz), publicly voiced their concerns about the regional economic crisis that should be solved by regional cooperation. They specifically asked the counties to end their opposition and support the reform. They specifically asked the counties to end their opposition and support the reform. Issues they brought on the agenda were investment in public infrastructure, economic development, regional marketing and vocational training.

The **Ruhr area** is a specific case as it demonstrates the problems of a lack of leadership in a polycentric and fragmented region. In the Ruhr area, a mayor of one of the four big cities (Dortmund, Bochum, Essen and Duisburg) never finds the acceptance of the other mayors and county presidents. The four cities operate in a system of checks and balances and occasional opportunistic behavior. In addition, the director of planning association competes not only with the municipal leaders but also with the heads of the other regional associations (the Emscher Genossenschaft in particular). This actor constellation hampered long-term collective vision and reliable collaboration (Kunzmann 2004). Private actors formed their own initiatives but are not well included into the governance arrangement (compared for example to the case of Stuttgart where the private sector is involved in the development agency). The more important initiative is the Initiativkreis Ruhr: it’s both an association (Verein) and a limited liability company or agency (GmbH) with 65 members (largely entreprises that have an interest to produce a club good). The Initiative sees its purpose in the support of the transformation of the post-industrial region.

In **Frankfurt** the director of the planning association has a weak political reputation as well, in particular if we compare his influence to the to influence and role of the lord mayor of the city of Frankfurt. The mayor of the core city never acted as a facilitator of metropolitan governance. This changed in 2012 when the new mayor Peter Feldmann from the Social Democratic Party replaced the long term reign of Petra Roth from the Christian Democrats. He tried to take a leading role in the construction of the metropolitan region Rhine-Main and approached the surrounding municipalities but so far we don’t see any result in terms of
in institutional changes. One reason is the fact that the state government of Hesse does not fully support the idea of a more consolidated metropolitan region Rhine-Main.

The affiliation of the mayors to political parties is of course a factor that may enhance cooperation and the balance of power at the intermunicipal level or block cooperation and steps of further integration in case of mayors coming from different parties in the core city and its surroundings (see Heinelt et al. 2011: 277-78).

In Toulouse, the election of a social democrat in 2008 enabled more relaxed relationships with the surrounding communes that were also governed by social democrats. Before the political leaders of core city of Toulouse had shown limited interest in intermunicipal cooperation. Whereas the metropolitan strategies had formerly mainly been focussed on economic development and the location of industry the perspective changed after 2008. The will to control the urban development and confirm the role of Toulouse as metropolis led to a strengthening of urban planning as metropolitan task, the development of a common development strategy in form of strategic documents (plan local de l’habitat 2011, plan de déplacements urbains 2012, plan climat-énergie territorial 2012), urban projects and a more integrated form of metropolitan governance (first CU, then métropole) (Balti et al 2016a: 52; Balti et al 2016b: 17ff). Following the re-election of a centre-right mayor in 2014 the historic tensions re-emerged, among others concerning the revision of the traffic plan and the trail of a metro line influencing urban development projects (Balti et al 2016a: 55).

In Bordeaux, the political dominance of the republican mayors was backed up by the republican bloc of mayors within the CU and their outstanding role within the Republican Party at national level. The concentration on one strong leader in the core city and the CU at the same time was two times interrupted (1977-1983 and 2004-2014) during phases when the socialists had won elections and socialist mayors became president of the CU (Sorbets 2015: 153ff; see for similar results with regard to the party affiliation of mayors in Germany, the case of Hanover in particular: Heinelt et al. 2011: 155-159 and 277).

As has been mentioned for the case of Stuttgart, private actors are a relevant force in German discussions on city regionalism. In the long going debates about metropolitan reforms in Frankfurt / Rhine-Main, the local Chamber of commerce Frankfurt and other private associations were quite influential but not well coordinated. In the middle of 1991 the chambers of commerce of the
Frankfurt/Rhine-Main area intensified their cooperation and established the IHK-Forum Rhine-Main, which Blatter (2005: 144) called an economic “Regionalallianz”. In 1995 another organization for economic cooperation was established: the Economic Development Agency for the Region of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main (Wirtschaftsförderung Region Frankfurt/Rhein-Main). This time the UVF - dominated by Social Democrats - was the initiator which established this agency as a kind of counterweight to the IHK-Forum. Among its members municipalities are in the majority, but other actors are also involved. Having a different perspective from local authorities and their political and administrative representatives, they are not overwhelmed by particular local interests and can therefore contribute to the creation of a common vision. The aim of the agency (now connected to the planning association, the successor to the UVF) is the coordination and fostering of metropolitan-wide cooperation in the field of economic development. In 1996, about 150 enterprises in the region established the Economic Initiative Frankfurt/Rhine-Main (Wirtschaftsinitiative Frankfurt/Rhein-Main). The main reason for founding this initiative was concern about the lack of a “unified regional image” (Hoyler et al. 2006: 130). In May 2010 entrepreneurs in the region issued a complex analysis in the region’s situation coming to negative conclusions regarding the current legal structure and presenting their own organizational proposal (Hille 2010). It is a widely spread view that Frankfurt/Rhine-Main lays behind those metropolitan areas that have already responded to the problems of the organizational fragmentation and established some kind of metropolitan governance arrangement capable of reaching binding decisions.

Private actors seem to be less relevant in the governance of French city regions. However, the case of the technopole strategy of Grenoble shows that private actors and universities can be important players favoring metropolitan cooperation. In Toulouse the aerospace industry and research institutions are strong drivers behind the development of the knowledge economy and the role of Toulouse as a metropolis of national relevance. An additional governance layer where other partners and private actors such as universities, port authorities, tourism agencies, economic development agencies, commerce chambers etc. can directly be integrated into metropolitan governance are the pôles métropolitains, but the POPSU material does not include those initiatives, as the possibility to open the partnerships has only been created in 2014.
3.3 Space and Scales

The emergence of institutions at the metropolitan level has an impact on the multilevel governance system and the repartition of competences, resources and democratic legitimacy. However, neither in Germany nor in France, the metropolitan level has been established as a fully-fledged new level of territorial administration, though in France it has been discussed to abolish the départements.

With regard to the territorial organisation of the state, the size of municipalities is relevant for the purpose of metropolitan cooperation. It is a well-known fact that a territorial reform was never accomplished in France. Local government in France is still characterized by a large number of municipalities and many of them are very small in terms of territory and inhabitants. Correspondingly, many municipalities have low administrative capacities and this has been the basis for intermunicipal cooperation for decades. Also the concept of métropoles follows this tradition of multi-purpose associations for service provision, especially water treatment, waste management, urban regeneration and transport. More strategic planning functions have been added recently.

German municipalities experienced several phases of incorporation of municipalities into bigger core cities despite local protests and issues of local identity. Larger territorial and functional reforms took place in the 1970s in some of the federal states (Northrhine-Westfalia in particular). As a result, the scope of competences of local self-government depends on the size and status of a city. The counties constitute the second tier of local government and are service providers for smaller municipalities (Germany has about 300 counties), whereas the bigger cities (so called Kreisfreie Stadt or county exempt cities, about 100 cities such as Munich and Frankfurt) have the competences of a county and a municipality. Against this background, the purpose of metropolitan cooperation was from the beginning of the 1990s onwards accomplishing a more coherent spatial development and, later on, having the critical mass for marketing at a supraregional level (as business location, but also for culture, tourism and, more recently, science) whereas the competences for technical services have mostly remained at the level of cities and counties.

As a result, the evolution of the metropolitan perimeter differs remarkably between the two states. France experiences, in particular since 2009, a step by step evolution of larger and functionally more integrated metropolitan governments. Minimum thresholds in terms of inhabitants for métropoles have been created as a recent
incentive for some municipal groupings to increase their perimeter. The size and number of municipal groupings of all scales (CC, CA, CU, métropole) is under a process of transformation towards fewer, larger and more integrated entities at the moment. **Bordeaux** is an exception in this regard as its perimeter remained almost unchanged over decades, with one additional municipality joining in 2013. Also in **Grenoble**, the size of the cooperation area has evolved only a little bit from its foundation with 23 members in the 1960ies up to 27 municipalities in 2004. However, in 2014 the metropolitan perimeter was considerably enlarged in terms of members and surface by fusion with two CC. It has now up to 49 member municipalities. **Nantes** started its intermunicipal organisation in 1992 with a district urbain including 20 municipalities and expanded in two steps up to 24 municipalities in 2001, remaining unchanged since. **Toulouse** in contrast recently experienced an enormous growth from 13 municipalities in 1992 to 37 since 2011. Still, the new métropoles are better described as city regions and not, again the German background, as metropolitan regions. Despite the fact that the métropoles d’équilibre in the 1960ies/70ies comprised much bigger areas, the métropoles in these days have smaller perimeters. In the case of Bordeaux, Toulouse and Grenoble, the métropole is not even entirely covering the urban agglomeration, whereas in Nantes the métropole corresponds more or less to the urban agglomeration (“unité urbaine”), meaning the build-up area without interruptions of more than 200 meters (Geppert 2017; INSEE). Still, the debate is about supporting city regions with a supra-regional or at least regional economic radiance as a counterweight to Paris.

Because of the urban system created by the centralistic state with one global metropolis and many medium sized cities, many of the French metropolises are not only smaller in terms of perimeter but also concerning the number of inhabitants of the urban area, with the extreme examples of the métropoles Brest and Nancy not even reaching 300,000 inhabitants.

The territories of the métropoles of Bordeaux, Toulouse and Nantes are monocentric with most of its municipalities forming one continuous urbanised space and only two to five less populated municipalities at the fringes not being part of that urbanised unit. Due to its alpine location, the urbanisation pattern of Grenoble follows the valleys and the métropole includes more sparsely populated municipalities. 22 municipalities of the métropole are not part of the continuously urbanised unit, whereas it stretches in the north-ouest and north-est outside of the administrative boundaries (following classification of INSEE, 1.1.2016).
Unlike France, the German system is more static. The planning regions and their size have once been delimitated and there have been almost no changes in their perimeter. An exception is, as mentioned above, the case of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main. In a hierarchical intervention, the government of the federal state of Hessen forced more than 30 municipalities to become a member of the regional planning association in 2000. There is no doubt that these new perimeter reflects the functional urban area (commuter shed) but these municipalities showed a lot of resistance as they are now part of a stricter land use planning scheme.

The institutional inertia or non-preparedness to adapt planning regions to real social and economic developments was no problem for decades because the planning regions were rather big from the beginning. Only in the last 10 to 15 years the question of re-scaling emerged in the German debate on city regions and metropolitan areas. However, cooperation is the preferred solution while the creation of a new jurisdiction is exceptional (this happened in the past only in Hanover and the city region of Aachen). The cooperative pattern is visible in the introduction of the new concept of metropolitan regions by the federal government and the federal states. The so-called European Metropolitan Regions in Germany are supposed to be engines for economic, societal and cultural development and they encompass rather huge areas.

Table 1: European Metropolitan Region in Germany (selection, see also map in appendix)\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Size (km(^2))</th>
<th>Inhabitants (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>25.547</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhine-Ruhr</td>
<td>11.742</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruhr</td>
<td>4.437</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>15.427</td>
<td>5.2 (City Region 2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt Rhine-Main</td>
<td>14.755</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially only the most powerful and biggest regions were included (Munich, Stuttgart, Rhine-Ruhr, Frankfurt Rhine-Main, Hamburg and Berlin). Later a few more metropolitan regions such as Hannover-Braunschweig-Göttingen-Wolfsburg, Bremen-Oldenburg, Nuremberg-Erlangen-Fürth and Rhine-Neckar have been added. The notion of “European metropolitan region” evokes a minimum size that is rather

huge, as these metropolitan regions are supposed to have a supra regional role. The concept also reflects an urban system in a federal state with many big agglomerations instead of one dominating center. However, as no state grants and formal competencies have been given to these new actors, the regions are still in an experimental stage. What the exact purpose, governance and impact will be is an open question. The emergence of these new scales was troublesome in most cases and can best be described by referring to the concept of politics of scale (Swyngedouw 2004; Keil and Mahon 2009; Brenner 2004). This indicates that the re-configuration of scales is a process of contested re-arranging of functions, territorial interests and division of power. The result is not very stable.

In the case of Rhine-Ruhr, the jumping of scales took place in the mid 1990s when the government of Northrhine-Westfalia defined a larger Metropolis Rhine-Ruhr in the development plan of the state (Danielzyk et al. 2008; Blotevogel and Schulze 2010). This metropolitan area includes the Ruhr area, the major cities of Düsseldorf and Cologne and the peri-urban areas in-between. In sheer numbers this Rhine-Ruhr metropolis has ca. 11 million inhabitants and considerable economic power. With regard to the creation of a governing institution or some form of voluntary regional cooperation it must be considered a failure. The more prosperous cities (Düsseldorf, Cologne) in the south were less inclined to engage in such a large-scale institutional solution and stressed the distinctiveness with regard to the post-industrial Ruhr area in the northeast. As a result, the Rhine-Ruhr Metropolis remained a lifeless vision but was still named European Metropolitan Region Rhine-Ruhr. The new state plan for Northrhine-Westfalia clearly distinguishes now between the metropolitan region “Ruhr” and the metropolitan region “Rhine”.

Hanover is an interesting case with regard to territorial re-scaling because a three-scaled arrangement is slowly evolving since 2005. Next to the Region Hannover, which is a county-like entity after the amalgamation of the core city, the county and the former planning association in the year 2000 (ca. 1 million inhabitants), two further scales have been established by initiatives of local governments. The city network Extended Economic Area Hannover consists of the municipalities of the so-called second ring surrounding the region of Hanover. It's an informal association that tries to establish reliable working relations with the region Hannover in particular in the field of public transport. On the next - much bigger - scale the European Metropolitan Region Hannover, Braunschweig, Wolfsburg, Göttingen is
the result of the above mentioned joined initiative of the federal states and federal government. This is a very large cooperation area including the rural hinterland, constituting a genuine regional level beyond urban areas. At least on paper the Metropolitan Region is an implementation of the concept of urban-rural-partnership or „associations of responsibility“ (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft). However, in terms of impact and governance the outlook is rather vague. Nevertheless, the example of Hanover is an interesting case of multi-scaled metropolitan governance where a strong core (Region Hanover) with a directly elected regional council and a broad bundle of functions (regional planning, public transport, hospitals, etc.) is complemented by softer forms of voluntary cooperation on larger scales. The same applies to the Metropolitan of Stuttgart where the larger European Metropolitan Region exists next to the smaller City Region Stuttgart (Verband Region Stuttgart). The latter is much stronger in terms of competences and has a formal governance structure. In the beginning, the relationship between both scales was characterized by rivalries.

As we will show in the next section, the differentiation of scales of territorial development and regulation does happen also in the France where the pôles métropolitain constitute another scale beside the métropole.

3.4 Ideas of Territorial Regulation

As has been illustrated by the French cases (Toulouse in particular) the delimitation of metropolitan areas in terms of jurisdictions mostly does not match the functional area relevant for urban development (urban area or commuter shed). The emerging governance arrangements are largely predetermined by existing administrative boundaries and municipalities that are able to gather around a common interest and to create an intermunicipal grouping. Different scales of metropolitan cooperation in Germany and in France lead to different types of plans at the metropolitan level and yet another repartition of competences between the different governance levels.

If we consider the territorial regulation at the metropolitan level, the Métropole de Nantes is a telling case for the changes in governance and territorial regulation at the local and regional level in France (Pinson 2010). Pinson describes this emerging new regulatory regime as a mix of entrepreneurial strategies, decentralization and project based urban development. The regulatory regime is still under control of public actors from the local and regional jurisdictions but the implication is a much more politicized regional policy arena. In institutional terms, the CU “Métropole de
Nantes” is the organizational core for the regulation of territorial development, though not being responsible for the SCoT (which is in the responsibility of a Syndicate mixte du SCoT Nantes-St. Nazaire, being responsible for a bigger territory including several intermunicipal groupings and being now a pôles métropolitain).

In terms of implementation, the Île de Nantes was the major urban development project in the last decade. The Île de Nantes had a major impact on the development in the whole region as it affected also decision about major transport projects and corridors. The CU had a huge influence in this regard but was not the only organization responsible for the implementation. In addition, an agency has been created that has, among other responsibilities, as its main purpose the implementation of the Île de Nantes regeneration scheme. SAMOA (Societe d’aménagement de la métropole quest atlantique) is an interesting form of governance as the Mayor of Nantes is the head of this agency but it is financed by two regions (10%), Nantes Métropole (58%), the city of Nantes (17%) and the Syndicate mixte du SCoT Nantes-St. Nazaire (5%). SAMOA is a regional development agency under control of the mayor that is also responsible for the implementation of the strategic agenda of the SCoT. The SCoT, however, is elaborated not by SAMOA but by a special purposes association (Syndicate mixte du SCoT Nantes-St. Nazaire). This association has been transformed in 2012 into the pôle métropolitain Nantes-St Nazaire, beeing organized as a syndicat as well. In a way, SAMOA is the only organization where the different actors from different levels being responsible for different territories meet and collaborate. The territory of Nantes Métropole is the area where the different jurisdictions show an overlap and the concrete outcome is the success of the Île de Nantes regeneration scheme. We may call this successful fragmegration. This idea of territorial regulation is in stark contrast to the German idea of integrated territorial development. The Regions of Stuttgart and Hanover are exemplary cases as both agencies bring together a broad bundle of functions (statutory regional planning, transport planning and management, waste management, economic development etc.) though having different governance structures (Heinelt et al. 2011).

However, we observe in France the clear state-led strategy to implement a more consolidated form of territorial regulation and stop fragmegration. An upscaling of local land use planning has taken place. In 2013, the CU Nantes Métropole published

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7 http://www.nantessaintnazeire.fr/qu-est-ce-que-c-est/#statuts-et-objectifs
the Principes d’aménagement métropolitain and already in 2010 the CU Nantes Métropole took over the responsibility for the ZAC / Zone d’Aménagement Concerté) (being a municipal task before) (Dèbre 2016: 123).

Today, both strategic development plans and municipal land use plans are a compulsory competence to be transferred from the municipalities to the metropolitan administration. In the future intercommunal plans (PLU) will be elaborated replacing the municipal ones. This makes sense because the municipalities in the urban core mostly form one continuous urban fabric and many of the municipalities at the outskirts are too small to have an own professional planning administration.

However, the consolidation of planning responsibilities is an issue in French communes. One reason why Grenoble has never become a communauté urbaine is the fact that the municipalities did not want to cede the competences for urban planning and building permissions (Louargant 2013: 56). The local zoning plan (plan local d’urbanisme) is a compulsory competence for the métropole, but not for the communauté d’agglo. In Grenoble, it has been a municipal competence until 2015 and will be replaced by an intercommunal zoning plan for the whole territory, presumably in 2019. Until it has been approved, the existing municipal plans remain valid. The municipal grouping has not been a dominant player for the urban development in the past, neither for land use planning nor for strategic development planning as it was not seen as the appropriate scale for strategic decisions. In most of the other métropoles, the competence for urban planning has already been upscaled to the metropolitan level earlier as 10 out of 15 métropoles had been a CU before with a compulsory competence for urban development and planning.

The more strategic level of regional spatial planning, the SCoT does not correspond to the area of the métropole in most cases as it is supposed to cover a spatially coherent area. It is generally larger than one municipal grouping, but taking into account their borders as a SCoT covers several municipal groupings entirely and not just some of the municipalities. The perimeter of the SCoT is in the three cases Montpellier, Rouen and Nice identical with the métropole and in the two cases Nantes and Brest identical with the pôle métropolitain. In the other cases it constitutes a complementary layer of cooperation with considerable differences in size (see table).
Table 2: number of municipalities covered by SCOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Métropole</th>
<th>number of municipalities (1.1.2017)</th>
<th>number of municipalities covered by SCOT (31.12.2015)</th>
<th>perimeter of SCOT corresponds to...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brest</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>pôle métropolitain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>20 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rennes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montpellier</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>métropole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>10 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>10 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouen</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>métropole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>métropole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nantes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>pôle métropolitain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>7 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>9 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lille</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>3 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3 EPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aix-Marseille</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>smaller than the métropole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grenoble** has a SCoT considerably larger than the municipal grouping. In 2000, a *Schéma directeur* for 157 municipalities was adopted and the SCoT de la Region Urbaine de Genoble from 2012 even covered 273 municipalities or more specifically - ten municipal groupings. The perimeter has been slightly enlarged again since then and the syndicat is composed out of 285 municipalities in 2017. This plan does correspond to the functional area (bassin de vie), but not to any political entity making it difficult to formulate clear lines of development and to agree on them. This leads to the effect that the orientations are only clearly readable where the consensus was high but remain vague on conflicting topics. It was possible to formulate restrictive rules for the protection of nature and landscape and define quantitative limitation for urban extensions and retail development in the periphery but the scheme has little guiding content regarding common projects for the future development of the metropolis (Novarina and Seigneuret 2013: 50–56; 109).

In the case of **Toulouse**, two strong independent municipal groupings are touching the city in the south, the CA de SICOVAL and the CA de Muretain. This co-

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8 Source CGET  
construction of supraco mmunal spaces has, among other factors, hampered a coherent development of a public transport system, as the municipalities of the CA du Muretain have not been part of the public transport association. A step forward was made in 2008 as the new transport plan (plan de déplacements urbains PDU) covers the same area as the SCoT and several new lines connecting the periphery have been planned. An instrument to reach a certain coherence of spatial development in the large urbanised area around Toulouse is the INTER-SCoT, defining guiding principles and a strategic vision for the urban development for a large territory covering four SCoT, launched in 2006 and approved in 2010. The risk of metropolitan fragmentation due to an inadequate perimeter of planning documents was already discussed in the 1990ies, but the large territory, the enormous number of municipalities affected and the weak culture of intercommunal cooperation made a single SCoT for the whole area unfeasible, leading to the INTER-SCoT initiative as a softer instrument of coordination. Notwithstanding that the number of actors involved in the SCoT of the core area (secteur centre) is already high with 7 EPCI and 114 municipalities, the INTER-SCoT even covers over 400 municipalities (Balti et al 2016a: 54ff).

In the German city regions, spatial planning at the metropolitan level adds a regional dimension, but does not replace the local land use plan, for which the competence remains at the city level. The regulation of land use in metropolitan areas is an issue in Germany and experts question the existing two-level arrangement as being not effective. In two metropolitan areas, intercommunal land use plans (Regionaler Flächennutzungsplan) have been created replacing the municipal ones (2010 in six cities of the metropolitan region Ruhr, 2011 in Frankfurt Rhine-Main). In the case of Frankfurt, one of the main functions of the Umlandverband Frankfurt (established in 1975) was the regulation of land use in a growing region. The instrument in use was the joined land use plan. A new instrument, the regional land use plan was introduced in 2000. This preparatory land use plan is in principle a municipal plan, but in the region Frankfurt/Rhine-Main this task has been shifted to the Regional Planning Association. Because the territory of the new planning association includes 75 rather than 43 municipalities, the plan exhibits a stronger regional dimension and is therefore considered to be an innovative instrument for the coordination of land use in metropolitan areas. The plan has to be developed in collaboration with the government office of the region responsible for the regional plan. Therefore, a tension between regional planning and intermunicipal land use planning is
unsurprising. In **Stuttgart** a different solution has been found: based on the state planning law of Baden-Württemberg, the regional planning association can force municipalities to adapt local land use plans to the regional plan. Furthermore, the association has the legal power to specify areas for settlements and infrastructure in the regional plan. Given municipal autonomy in land use planning, it is not usual for regional plans in Germany to be that precise (gebietsscharf).

4. Conclusion

We can conclude that, compared to France, the evolvement of metropolitan governance in Germany followed a different pattern. In France, a strong national political framework (most recently Law MAPTAM) still prevails and provides for institutional forms with predefined minimum competences, financing and institutional design. As mentioned in the sections before, such a nation wide legal framework is missing in Germany, resulting in a still higher variety of local solutions. At the same time, city regions in Germany are weaker in terms of competences compared to their French counterparts. Nevertheless, remarkable local variations and pathways do exist in France as well like the case studies above illustrate. First of all, even the national framework includes tailor-made solutions, namely for Lyon, Aix-Marseille and Paris. Secondly, the national laws are only setting the frame and sometimes enforce higher levels of integration or larger perimeters, but the intercommunal cooperation both in the metropolitan areas as well as elsewhere in the country is predominantly done by choice of the municipalities. There is room for maneuver to formulate initiatives locally based on a system of incentives and thus decide politically, resulting in a higher politicization of local politics (Pinson 2010) as a consequence of the decentralization reforms since the 1980s (Borraz and Le Galés 2005, Negrier 2005). Thirdly, metropolitan governance has developed step by step and is coined in each city region by its own history of intercommunal cooperation and local peculiarities. The status of métropole is just the most recent step in that history and there is probably more to come. Overall, therefore, the effect of the MAPTAM law should not be overestimated, nor does it induce a complete path change. Decentralization and regionalization, or to be more precise city regionalism can go hand in hand.

In Germany, this continuous debate and change of governance of city regions is less visible. Dynamic developments in search of adequate perimeters and repartitions of competences, upscaling of municipal competences regarding urban planning and
transport to the metropolitan level, the creation of new sublevels for service provision (Nantes: pôles de proximité, Toulouse: pôles territoriaux) to bridge the distance between the center and the periphery are issues that remain largely untouched in Germany. One reason may be the fact the state grants or the allocation of competences are not used as in an incentive for the change of metropolitan governance in Germany. Further obstacles for the creation of metropolitan governance arrangements, however, are the same in France and Germany: fear of the overwhelming power of the central city, huge number of municipalities making the political process difficult, different political party affiliation of political leaders.

The influence and role of private actors varies in Germany. One example where private actors were the driving force was the creation of the Verband Region Stuttgart and, to a lesser degree and less successful, Frankfurt-Rhine/Main. Also in the Ruhr area an association of companies (Initiativkreis Ruhr) founded in 1989 is pushing the economic development of the region and finances projects. This role of private actors is less visible in the cases described in the thematic axis Governance and territorial regulation in the POPSU II programme. But in contrast to the German cases, the role of universities started to be a topic for metropolitan regions in France.

The governance of larger polycentric metropolitan regions is of particular interest. The emergence of multi-scaled arrangements is observable in France as well as in Germany (pôles métropolitains and European Metropolitan regions). In France, the pôles métropolitains are smaller in terms of size and have a formalized governance structure (i.e. syndicate). The 11 German Metropolitan Regions are usually bigger and most of them have an informal governance structure. In the case of Germany, these new multi-scaled arrangements are not the result of careful institutional design but highly contingent on local actor constellations. This implies that the arrangements are unstable and may disappear. The emergence of these new scale can best be described and explained by referring to the concept of politics of scale (Keil and Mahon 2009; Brenner 2009). We see scales as social and political constructions that are not necessarily institutionalized in a formal way nor follow pure functionalist explanations (Keil and Mahon 2009). Politics of scale is described as a process where “diverse social forces actively struggle to reorganize the functions, organizational embodiments, and/or interconnections among spatial scales” (Brenner 2009: 45). Furthermore, we agree with Keil and Mahon that “Rescaling involves a complex, highly contested reconfiguration of interscalar
arrangements, including the invention of new scales of action and emancipation” (Keil and Mahon 2009: 4). The introduction of the European Metropolitan Regions fostered not only the focus on economic development but also include private actors. Although the new and - in terms of spatial reach – larger scales did not come at the expense of smaller scales the process is characterized by struggles (see cases of Stuttgart and Rhine-Ruhr). In particular in France, the reconfiguration of scales happens in the context of the parallel processes of decentralization and regionalization of the administration. This is observable in Germany to a lesser degree (Kuhlmann and Wayenberg 2015; Baldersheim and Rose 2010).

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Sources POPSU


Appendix: European Metropolitan Regions in Germany